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Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access originally published online on May 28, 2004
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Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), 485-511
© Oxford University Press 2004; All rights reserved

Gender discrimination and intergenerational transmission of preferences

Luisa Escriche*, Gonzalo Olcina{dagger}, and Rosario Sánchez{dagger}

* Campus dels Tarongers, Av. dels Tarongers, s/n. Edificio Departamental Oriental, 46022 Valencia; e-mail: luisa.escriche{at}uv.es {dagger} University of Valencia

This paper provides an explanation for the existence of gender discrimination in the labour market focusing on the intergenerational transmission of preferences related to the attitude of women towards jobs and family. Changes in women's preferences over generations depend on the socialization efforts of their parents which in turn are influenced by both the firm's expected recruitment policy and the expected utility from household care. We obtain two types of steady state equilibria: the discriminatory equilibrium, in which women are segregated to low-paid jobs, and the non-discriminatory equilibrium, in which women are hired in highly-paid jobs. The conditions of convergence to each equilibrium are analysed.


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