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Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access originally published online on August 20, 2004
Oxford Economic Papers 2004 56(4):643-666; doi:10.1093/oep/gpf067
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Right arrow D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Right arrow D72 - Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Right arrow I21 - Analysis of Education
Right arrow I22 - Educational Finance
Right arrow J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Right arrow O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
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© Oxford University Press 2004; All rights reserved

Education choice, neoclassical growth, and class structure

Buly A. Cardak

Department of Economics and Finance, La Trobe University, Bundoora 3086, Victoria, Australia; e-mail: b.cardak{at}latrobe.edu.au

The evolution of income distribution is studied in a dynamic model of education choice where both public and private education are available. Public education is financed using a tax rate determined by majority voting. The analysis focuses on neoclassical growth in order to ensure tractability in identifying a steady state. Possible voting equilibria in the steady state are characterized, with steady state income distribution found to be bimodal. Public education offers higher growth to the poor in the transition to the steady state, however public education students converge to the lower mode of the income distribution. Under some conditions, universal public education offers steady state human capital superior to that available to any student in the mixed education model considered, while universal private education unconditionally offers steady state human capital superior to that of the mixed education model.


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