Skip Navigation


Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access originally published online on June 22, 2004
Oxford Economic Papers 2004 56(4):701-713; doi:10.1093/oep/gpf061
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
56/4/701    most recent
gpf061v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Ciccone, A.
Right arrow Articles by Costain, J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Related Collections
Right arrow C70 - General
Right arrow D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© Oxford University Press 2004; All rights reserved

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Antonio Ciccone* and James Costain{dagger}

* Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR {dagger}Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid), Spain; e-mail: jcostain{at}eco.uc3m.es

Recent papers involving binary choices have argued that increasing heterogeneity decreases positive feedback. We show that no such result holds in models where all agents make interior choices. The results in the binary choice case arise for two reasons. First, if we increase heterogeneity without limit but impose a bounded choice set, then almost all players eventually become completely unresponsive, preferring some corner so strongly that they do not react to any feasible change in the behavior of others. Second, discrete choice permits the construction of strong, but fragile, positive feedbacks through composition effects.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.