Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access originally published online on August 17, 2005
Oxford Economic Papers 2005 57(4):664-673; doi:10.1093/oep/gpi030
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Incommensurability and the first fundamental welfare theorem
School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ; e-mail: m.qizilbash{at}uea.ac.uk
Some claim that incommensurability poses serious problems for the standard account of rationality and for the case for markets in economics. Incommensurability may indeed involve violations of basic axioms, such as completeness, transitivity and continuity. Sen's version of the maximization view of rationality avoids these problems. This view when combined with one axiomlocal insatiabilityallows us to prove a theorem with the same general thrust as the first fundamental welfare theorem. To this degree, the case for the market is vindicated. This result can be seen as non-welfarist because it involves a notion of resentment which may be best understood in terms of opportunity. A standard statement of the first welfare theorem can also be proven if we focus on quasi-orderings.
Key Words: JEL classification: C60 D60 I30