Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access originally published online on July 21, 2005
Oxford Economic Papers 2005 57(4):732-739; doi:10.1093/oep/gpi033
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© Oxford University Press 2005; All rights reserved
Comment on Market discipline and monetary policy by Carl Walsh

*Department of Economics, University of Brazil, ICC Norte, Asa Norte, 70910900 Brasilia, DF, Brazil; e-mail: bugarin{at}unb.br
Central Bank of Brazil and University of Brasília
This paper shows that the results Walsh (2000, Market discipline and monetary policy, Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 24971) obtains are highly sensitive to the assumption that different wage contracts are based on different information sets even though they are negotiated simultaneously. In particular, the power of future expectations to discipline an opportunistic central banker is much weaker when homogeneous information sets are used.