Skip Navigation


Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access originally published online on June 12, 2006
Oxford Economic Papers 2006 58(4):596-635; doi:10.1093/oep/gpl007
This Article
Right arrow Full Text Freely available
Right arrow FREE Full Text (PDF) Freely available
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
58/4/596    most recent
gpl007v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (13)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Armour, J.
Right arrow Articles by Cumming, D.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Related Collections
Right arrow G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Rating Agencies
Right arrow G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
Right arrow G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Right arrow G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
Right arrow H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
Right arrow K22 - Corporation and Securities Law
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© Oxford University Press 2006 All rights reserved

The legislative road to Silicon Valley

John Armour*, and Douglas Cumming{dagger},

*Faculty of Law and Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Trinity Hall, Cambridge CB2 1TJ, UK
{dagger}Director, Severino Center for Technological Entrepreneurship, Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180

Correspondence: e-mail: j.armour{at}law.cam.ac.uk

Correspondence: e-mail: Douglas{at}Cumming.com

Must policymakers seeking to replicate the success of Silicon Valley's venture capital market first copy other US institutions, such as deep and liquid stock markets? Or can legislative reforms alone make a significant difference? In this paper, we compare the economic and legal determinants of venture capital investment, fundraising, and exits. We introduce a cross-sectional and time series empirical analysis across 15 countries and 14 years of data spanning an entire business cycle. We show that liberal bankruptcy laws stimulate entrepreneurial demand for venture capital; that government programmes more often hinder than help the development of private equity, and that the legal environment matters as much as the strength of stock markets. Our results imply generalizable lessons for legal reform.

Key Words: JEL classification: G24 • G28 • G33 • G38 • H25


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Am Law Econ RevHome page
J. Armour and D. Cumming
Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship
Am. Law Econ. Rev., September 1, 2008; 10(2): 303 - 350.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 REV FINANC STUDHome page
D. Cumming
Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance
Rev. Financ. Stud., September 1, 2008; 21(5): 1947 - 1982.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Cambridge J EconHome page
D. J. Cumming and J. G. MacIntosh
Mutual funds that invest in private equity? An analysis of labour-sponsored investment funds
Camb. J. Econ., May 1, 2007; 31(3): 445 - 487.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.