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Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access originally published online on September 15, 2008
Oxford Economic Papers 2009 61(3):586-602; doi:10.1093/oep/gpn032
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© Oxford University Press 2008 All rights reserved

From public monopsony to competitive market: more efficiency but higher prices

Josse Delfgaauw* and Robert Dur{dagger}

*Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Tinbergen Institute, P.O. Box 1738, Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e-mail: delfgaauw{at}few.eur.nl
{dagger}Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, and CESifo; e-mail: dur{at}few.eur.nl

JEL classifications: H42, J31, J42, J45, L33, M50


  Abstract

This paper examines the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimizing public firm. Workers in the economy are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector. In line with empirical findings, our model implies that firms in the competitive market reach higher productivity and employ less workers than the public firm. Allocative efficiency therefore increases. Nevertheless, prices of the sector's output rise as competition between private firms for the best motivated workers leads to higher wage cost than under the public monopsony. Political support for liberalization may therefore be limited.


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