Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access published online on January 18, 2008
Oxford Economic Papers, doi:10.1093/oep/gpm045
© Oxford University Press 2008 All rights reserved
Voting games and computational complexity

*Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816–1400, USA; e-mail: gharrison{at}research.bus.ucf.edu.
Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, 28608, USA; e-mail: mcdanieltm{at}appstate.edu.
JEL classifications: C92, D72
| Abstract |
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Voting rules over three or more alternatives suffer from a general problem of manipulability. However, if the rule is difficult to manipulate, in some formal computational sense that is intrinsic to the rule or some cognitive sense specific to the set of voters, then one might not observe manipulation in practice. We evaluate this hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments. We conclude that one voting rule, due originally to Condorcet, is indeed behaviorally incentive-compatible despite being theoretically manipulable if the underlying preference environment is sufficiently diverse that voters have difficulty ascertaining others preferences.