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Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access published online on December 21, 2004
Oxford Economic Papers, doi:10.1093/oep/gpi006
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© Oxford University Press 2004; All rights reserved

Original Papers

The Prisoners' Dilemma and city-centre traffic

Mary Sissons Joshi 1, Vijay Joshi 2*, and Roger Lamb 3

1 Psychology Department, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford OX3 0BP
2 Department of Economics, University of Oxford
3 Psychology Department, Oxford Brookes University

* To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Vijay Joshi, E-mail: msissons-joshi{at}brookes.ac.uk


  Abstract

Such problems as inner-city traffic congestion and pollution are often asserted to be examples of the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma Game (PD), but there is a dearth of empirical research that tests this assertion. 551 car owners in Oxford responded to three pairs of alternatives designed as traffic versions of the four outcomes of the PD, by stating which alternative in each pair they preferred. Only 2% of respondents showed the full set of preferences which fit the PD. Four sets of preferences were common and accounted for 93% of responses suggesting that no single canonical game structure represents the traffic problem. The most common set of preferences, shown by 48% of respondents, fitted an ‘Assurance Game’. The results imply that the current city-centre traffic problem may be in substantial part due to lack of assurance and trust rather than raw self-interest. The public policy implications of the results are discussed.

Keywords: JEL classification: C70; C72.
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